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Railroad Functional Mergers:
Pooling and Trackage Agreements
Recent efforts to merge some of the nation's railroads
have called attention to the problems of over-investment
and excess capacity in the railroadindustry. This Article
examines possible solutions to these problems other than
complete consolidation by analyzing two means of partial combination-poolingand trackage agreements. After
comparing the economic advantages of each method and
criticizingthe currentregulatory statutes,Professor Conant
concludes that pooling and trackage agreements are in
the public interest since they tend to promote co-ordination and to reduce costs. He suggests that statutory regulation of such agreements should be terminated and that
the ICC should actively promote pooling and trackage
agreements by reviewing the supply and demand for railroadservices in particularareas.

Michael Conant*
Declining demand for some railroad services, due primarily to
the increased rivalry of other carriers, has accentuated the problems
of over-investment and excess capacity in the railroad industry.'
Indivisibilities of the fixed plant and the need for optimum transport units for efficiency require minimum scales of operations
that can be achieved only by combining the services of many parallel lines and terminals. Part of the answer is found in the consolidation of railroads accompanied by the abandonment of some lines
and facilities.' But there are many limits to railroad consolidation.
Most important among these are diseconomies of scale, 3 which may
be so large as to offset economies realized from abandonment of
duplicate facilities. Opposition of labor unions and governmental
* Associate Professor of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley.
1. For a definition of terms, see Cassels, Excess Capacity and Monopolistic Competition, 51 QJ. ECON. 426 (1937).
2. See Conant, Railroad Consolidations and the Regulation of Abandonments, 32 LIAND ECON. 318 (1956).
3. See HEALY, THE EFFECTs OF SCALE IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY

(1961).
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agencies and the financial problems of negotiating mergers may
also impede railroad consolidations.4
The purpose of this Article is to treat the problems of reducing
excess capacity in railroad facilities in ways other than through a
consolidation plan. This can be accomplished through functional
mergers of particular duplicate facilities or services, followed by
abandonment of redundant fixed plant or discontinuance of certain services. Functional mergers can be accomplished by pooling
agreements, trackage agreements, joint ownership of facilities, or a
combination of these. The economic advantages of each of these
methods of partial combination will be examined and compared.
The applicable regulatory statutes will be reviewed critically and
new statutes designed to effect economic reallocation of resources
will be suggested.
I.

POOLING AGREEMENTS

Railway pooling agreements are of two main types: (1) pooling
of profits by an agreement to divide traffic or revenues in order to
reinforce rate-fixing agreements and prevent rate rivalry, and (2)
pooling of services by an agreement to control the number of
trains or services that each carrier will operate, which may incidentally result in the sharing of traffic and revenues.' The first
type has only long-run effects on the amount of resources in the
industry. The second type, however, is concerned explicitly with
limiting the resources utilized, thereby reducing aggregate costs of
operations of the carriers.
The pooling agreements of the nineteenth century were of the
first type and were designed to eliminate the rate rivalry of that
period.6 Since these agreements were in restraint of trade and
therefore were unenforceable at common law,7 they were highly
unstable, and secret concessions to some shippers were accentuated
when drops in aggregate demand increased excess capacity. Complaints of shippers led to the complete prohibition of pooling
agreements in section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act.8 They
4.

See generally

SAMPSON,

OBSTACLES

TO

RAILROAD

UNIFICATION

(1960).
5. See In re Pooling Freights, 115 Fed. 588, 589 (W.D. Tenn. 1902);
Boston & Me. R.R., 298 I.C.C. 703, 708-09 (1956).
6. See GRODINSKY, THE IOWA POOL 163-67 (1950); RIPLEY, RAILROADS FINANCE & ORGANIZATION 575-607 (1915); Hudson, The Southern

Railway & Steamship Association, 5 Q.J. ECON. 70 (1890).
7. See Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry., 61 Fed. 993,
997 (8th Cir. 1894) and cases cited therein; LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF
TRANSPORTATION 292-96 (5th ed. 1960).
8. 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1958).
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were subsequently also held illegal under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.'
The absolute prohibition on pooling agreements was not relaxed until 1920. Parallel, duplicate services of two railroads, both
operated at net losses because of severe excess capacity, required a
remedy based on agreement if one was to continue to serve shippers
on both lines. The request of the carriers and the recommendations of the ICC, based in part on the experience under unified
operations during World War I, resulted in an amendment of the
Interstate Commerce Act."0 Section 5 ( 1 ), which is still the effective
law, enables the Commission to approve and authorize pooling-ofservice agreements between carriers if it finds that the agreements
"will be in the interest of better service to the public, or economy
in operation, and will not unduly restrain competition."1 1
The complete elimination of the competition that might exist
between particular services of parallel carriers is a necessary concomitant of the pooling-of-service agreement. If duplicate trains or
facilities are abolished, this elimination of competition is seen even
more clearly. The statute failed to meet this issue. Recognizing
that restraint of competition is a necessary part of pooling agreements, the statute created confusion by failing to recognize that the
restraint is necessarily total; instead, it required some amount of
competition. In one case, the Commission sidestepped the issue by
a noncommittal interpretation. In speaking of the restraint on competition, it said that "whether [it] . . . is undue depends not on
its scope but on whether it is improper or inappropriate. '1' 12 It is
not surprising that such an ambiguous statute was little used, especially since the same type of constraint was not part of the con13
solidation section of the 1920 act.
Numerous situations exist where rivalry of two parallel railroads
with great excess capacity results in losses in particular services for
both carriers. In such a situation, improvements in technology are
not made, for both carriers would also show losses on this new investment. Yet neither carrier may find it wise to discontinue the
9. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290

(1897). For an illegal rate-fixing agreement that also contained a clause for

the sharing of traffic, see United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S.

505 (1898).
10. See 3A SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMIERCE COISIs1ON 404

(1935).
11. 41 Stat. 481 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1958). On the illegality of
pooling agreements made without ICC consent, see Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Peoria & P.U. Ry., 201 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Ill. 1962).
12. Express Contract, 1929, 275 I.C.C 739, 744 (1951).
13. 41 Stat. 481 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1958).
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service as long as revenues exceed out-of-pocket costs, and regulatory commissions may even require continuance of those services
that do not earn enough to cover out-of-pocket costs. There have
been a number of cases involving passenger services where pooling
agreements have been approved as a solution to this problem. 4 Thus, pooling of passenger service by three carriers between Portland and Seattle resulted in the reduction of the total
number of trains operated and made investment in a new, faster
train economically feasible.' 5 Since not all trains were pooled, the
Commission found that competition would not be unduly restrained.
In a similar passenger pool between the Minneapolis and Duluth
areas,16 the Duluth Chamber of Commerce petitioned the Commission to end the pool on the ground that it had destroyed competition and resulted in poor service. The petition was denied;
the Commission held that competition was not unduly restrained
since competition included buses and private automobiles. In a
later proceeding to reduce the number of trains on this run, it
was held that competition was not unduly restrained and that any
restraint of competition that did result was necessary to insure
the continued operation of passenger service by the three lines. 18
Declining patronage resulting from highway competition resulted in
approval of a similar passenger pooling agreement for carriers between Chicago and Duluth. 19
The superior door-to-door service of trucks has resulted in a
sharp decline in railroad less-than-carload freight (LCL). To minimize losses on LCL service while still offering daily service, parallel
railroads have entered pooling-of-service agreements. Each carrier hauls an LCL car over the route on alternate days or weeks for
all LCL freight of both roads without regard to routing instructions by the shipper. Although rates and service are fixed by
pooling agreements, the ICC has held that LCL pools will not unduly restrain competition as long as each road continues to solicit
14. For discussion of excess capacity in passenger service, see FEDERAL
COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, PASSENGER TRAFFIC REPORT

(1935).
15. Puget Sound-Portland Joint Passenger-Train Serv., 96 I.C.C. 116
(1925), modified, 128 I.C.C. 149 (1927), 167 I.C.C. 308 (1930), 169 I.C.C.
244 (1930), 194 I.C.C. 426 (1933), 218 I.C.C. 239 (1936).
16. Twin Cities & Head of Lakes Joint Passenger Train Serv., 107 I.C.C.
493 (1926), modified, 112 I.C.C. 403 (1926), 132 I.C.C. 413 (1927), 161
I.C.C. 1 (1930).
17. Twin Cities & Head of Lakes Joint Passenger Train Serv., 237 I.C.C.
381 (1940).
18. Joint Passenger Train Serv., 302 I.C.C. 355, 362 (1957).
19. Pooling Passenger Train Revenues & Serv., 194 I.C.C. 430 (1933),
modified, 220 I.C.C. 659 (1937), 223 I.C.C. 343 (1937), 243 I.C.C. 765
(1941), 269 I.C.C. 590 (1948); see Note, Regulation of Railroad Service
Competition, 48 YALE L.J. 143 (1938).
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traffic.2" In the New York-Miami Pool case, the Commission held
that competition would not be unduly restrained since neither the
other railroad in the area nor rival types of transport appeared to
protest the approval. 2 ' In the New York-Macon Pool case, the
Commission stated that the record established that the arrangement
did not unduly restrain competition; it did not state which facts
in the record proved this, however.' These cases indicate that expedited service, savings in costs, and rivalry of highway transport
will result in approval of LCL pooling agreements.
A number of pooling agreements have related to the use of the
iron ore docks on Lake Superior and the access tracks to them.'
There was substantial excess capacity in ore docks in Northern
Michigan, and certain of them had not been maintained. Rather
than make the large investments necessary to restore deteriorated
docks, the carriers pooled the use of the newer, maintained docks.
Such combination pooling and trackage agreements resulted in
more intense use of some of the docks and tracks, which in turn
resulted in savings.2 4 In these cases, the Commission found that
competition would not be unduly restrained, but in none of them
did the Commission analyze the factual elements of the alleged
competition.
There are some railroad services in which erratic shifts in demand for equipment make a single firm or association the most
efficient operating unit for the entire country. The freight cars
of the United States are the prime example of a pool in which all
railroads use each other's equipment at a fixed fee.' Pooling of
refrigeration cars has indicated that operation and leasing of specialized equipment by one firm is the lowest-cost operation. 2 The
20. Pooling of Merchandise Traffic, St. Louis to Los Angeles, 276 I.C.C.
424, 426 (1949).
21. Pooling, L.C.L. Freight Serv., New York to Miami, 283 I.C.C. 171,
174 (1951).
22.

ooling, L.C.L. Freight Serv., New York and Philadelphia to Ma-

con, 283 I.C.C. 158, 162 (1951); see Pooling, L.C.L. Traffic, Nashville to
Memphis; 291 I.C.C. 79 (1953).
-23. Pooling of Ore Traffic in Wis. & Mich., 219 I.C.C. 285 (1936),
affd in part sub. nom, Escanaba & L.S.R.R. v. United States, 21 F. Supp.
151 (1937), affd, 303 U.S. 315 (1938); Pooling Ore Traffic in Wis. & Mich.,

201 I.C.C. 13 (1934), modified, 302 I.C.C. 65 (1957); Northern Pac. Ry.,

154 I.C.C. 279 (1929); see Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United States, 195 F.

Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
,24. See Chicago &N.W.-Ry., 224 I.C.C. 8 (1937).
25. See generally FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, REPORT
ON FREIGHT CAR POOLING (1934); Symes, The Great American Car Pool,
112 RAILWAY AGE 492 (1942). See also Grunfeld, The Effect of the Per
Diem Rate on the Efficiency and Size of the American Railroad Freight-Car
Fleet, 32 J.Bus. 52 (1959).
26. E.g., Charges for Protective Serv. to Perishable Freight, 215 I.C.C.

684, 686 (1936).
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Commission has approved the pooling of earnings of the Fruit
Growers Express Company, organized by 19 Eastern and Southern
railroads, by holding
that the agreement would not in any way
27
restrain competition.
The supply of sleeping cars is another situation in which seasonal and geographic shifts in demand make one national company the most efficient operating unit. The Pullman Company,
which had bought out its competitors between 1867 and 1900,
was the sole supplier and operator of sleeping cars in the United
States between 1900 and 1944.28 As a result of an antitrust prosecution, Pullman was found to have monopolized sleeping car service by exclusionary devices embodied in its exclusive dealing contracts with railroads,2 9 and the court ordered an end to the exclusive agreements and the separation of the Pullman manufacturing and service companies. In a later proceeding, the sale of the
Pullman operating subsidiary to a pool of 56 railroads was approved."0 When the railroads applied to the ICC for permission
to pool service and earnings in their acquisition of Pullman Company, the agreement was approved in spite of the objections of
the Department of Justice." Under this agreement, most sleeping
cars were sold to individual railroads. The railroads in most cases
employed Pullman Company to operate the cars; the testimony indicated that unified operation was the most economical. The Commission found that the pooling agreement would not unduly restrain competition since fares would be fixed by the Pullman Company under ICC regulation in the same way as before the acquisition by the railroads. 2 The Commission also found that competition for passenger traffic would be just as keen after the pooling
arrangement as before. 3 The Department of Justice argued that
the continued operation of sleeping-car service by one company
would continue the monopolistic position of a single firm,34 but
27. Pooling of Refrigeration Earnings, 258 I.C.C. 24, 28 (1944), modified,
269 I.C.C. 490 (1948).
28. Sleeping car manufacture is not subject to regulation by the ICC, but
companies providing sleeping car service are common carriers. Interstate
Commerce Act § 1(3), 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(3)
(1958).
29. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943),
hearing on form of judgment, 53 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1944), judgment
approved per curiam, 55 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
30. United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
aff'd mem., 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
31. Pullman Co., 268 I.C.C. 473 (1947), modified, 276 I.C.C. 5 (1949),
294 I.C.C. 703 (1955), 306 I.C.C. 138 (1959).
32. 268 I.C.C. at 486-89.
33. Id. at 482-84.
34. Id. at 489. The district court made a contrary finding. United States
v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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since termination of the exclusive arrangements would not itself
cause new firms to enter the sleeping-car business, the Commission rejected the contention that dissolution of the Pullman operating company was an economically feasible solution to the monopoly problem.m
The pooling agreements of the Railway Express Agency exceeded
the restrictions of the Pullman case, for the ICC expressly approved
exclusive agency agreements with the railroads. The operation of
express cars on trains has many of the economic characteristics of
railroading. An express company must offer nationwide service,
and the optimum number of express cars on a single train is usually
only one. The local collection and delivery of small parcels is most
efficiently operated by one firm in order to minimize excess capacity.
American Railway Express Company was organized in 1918 under supervision of the Federal Director General of Railroads to
take over operations of the four largest existing express companies.
Under section 407 of the Transportation Act of 1920,6 the
ICC approved the permanent consolidation of these firms.' A pooling agreement between the express company and the railroads was
also approved.38 The Commission noted that even before consolidation, interlocking stock ownership had minimized competition among the predecessor companies. Although the potential
competition between these companies was eliminated by the consolidation and pooling agreements, the Commission found that
competition would not be unduly restrained.
In 1929, 86 railroads combined to organize Railway Express
Agency, Inc., to purchase the assets of the former express company
and to operate the service. The Commission approved uniform
agreements of all the railroads appointing the express agency as
their exclusive agent for transacting express business." Pooling
arrangements similar to those under the 1920 agreement were approved as not undue restraints on competition. When the exclusive
agency aspect of this agreement was attacked by the Department
of Justice as an attempt to monopolize,4" the Commission made a
special finding that such clauses were essential to the approved
35. 268 I.C.C. at 484-86.
36. 41 Stat. 480 (now 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5
(1958)).
37. Consolidation of Express Cos., 59 I.C.C. 459 (1920).
38. Express Contract, 1920, 59 I.C.C. 518 (1920).
39. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 150 I.C.C. 423, 429 (1929); see Railway Express Agency, Inc., 227 I.C.C. 517 (1938).

40. United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 981 (D.

Del. 1950), motion to dismiss granted, 101 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Del. 1951).
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42
pooling.41 Under section 5 (11 ) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
they became exempt from antitrust prosecution.
The one recent pooling agreement to be denied approval by the
ICC involved division of traffic, but the agreement was designed
to end previous restraints on service rather than to create new ones.
The Boston & Maine Railroad and the New Haven Railroad consented to terminate their routing combination and joint solicitation
that had diverted traffic from the New Haven's rival, the Delaware
& Hudson Railroad. 4 Each of the three roads agreed to solicit
traffic separately. The Commission found that the agreement resuited in neither better service to the public nor economy in operation.

II.

TRACKAGE AGREEMENTS

Agreements of one railroad to use the tracks of another or of
several railroads for joint use of terminals are many times adjuncts
to programs of parallel carriers for the abandonment of excess
capacity. Less often, they are designed to give a railroad entry into an area that it has never before served. Like pooling agreements,
trackage and joint-use agreements have been little used by the
railroads. Where portions of two railroads become parallel in a
particular area and both have substantial excess capacity, trackage
agreements over the straightest and most level segments of the two
lines could enable line abandonments and substantial cost reductions. Yet such agreements are extremely difficult to negotiate."
A railroad with a monopoly franchise on the most efficient route
through an area is reluctant to share this route even though rentals
would include a monopoly gain. A carrier is especially concerned
not to lose its monopoly of the smaller towns solely on its route
because, even with monopoly service, such stations involve great
costs for any excess capacity. For the carrier acquiring trackage
rights and abandoning its own less efficient route, there is the possibility that the owner will refuse to renew the trackage agreement
after the initial term expires. There is also the possibility that in
times of heavy traffic, the owning carrier will give the right of way
to its own trains and make the leasing carrier suffer all of the
delays. Such uncertainties, when added to the barriers to-abandon41. Express Contract, 1929, 275 I.C.C. 739 (1951). For renewals, see
Express Contract, 1954, 291 I.C.C. 11 (1953); Express Contract, 1959,
308 I.C.C. 545 (1959).
42. 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958).
43. Boston & Me. R.R., 298 I.C.C. 703 (1956).
44. For a discussion of trackage agreements before 1930, see GRODINSKY, RAILROAD CONSOLIDATION: ITS ECONOMICS AND CONTROLLING
PRINCIPLES 245-65 (1930).
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ment of less efficient routes, make carriers reluctant even to start
negotiations for trackage rights on parallel lines.
The number of trackage agreements negotiated in the United
States in one year is usually under 25 and the aggregate lines are
usually unider 400 miles. From July 1, 1960, to June 30, 1961, for
example, the ICC approved 23 trackage and joint-use agreements
for a total of 401 miles.45 Most of the agreements were for segments
of less than 20 miles. One for 138 miles involved joint use of Louisville terminal lines of the Kentucky and Indiana Terminal Railroad
Company; the: second longest, 77 miles, was the Central of Georgia
trackage over its subsidiary, the Savannah & Atlanta. Neither of
these two largest 1960-1961 trackage agreements involved parallel
lines or additional problems relating to abandonment.
Two sections of the Interstate Commerce Act give the ICC regulatory powers over railroad trackage agreements. Explicit power
to approve the voluntary agreements of carriers is in section 5(2)

(a):
It shall be lawful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission ... (i) for a carrier by railroad to acquire trackage rights
over, or joint ownership in or joint use of, any railroad line or lines
operated by any other such carrier, and terminals incidental
owned or
thereto. 46 ,

In section 3(5), a more limited power is given the Commission to
compel trackage agreements when incidental to required terminal
unifications. 47 The general power under section 5(2) will be
discussed first.
A.

TRACKAGE AGREEMENTS GENERALLY

The. trackage agreements that are relatively easy to negotiate
are those entirely within one railroad system, those between parent
and subsidiary, or those between two subsidiaries of the same parent. In St. Louis S.W. Ry. Abandonment,"8 both the petitioner
and the owner of the line were subsidiaries of the Southern Pacific.
Petitioner asked to abandon 51.24 miles of line between Commerce and-Sheiman, Texas, and take trackage on 46.23 miles of
the Texas & New Orleans Railroad at a rental of one dollar and
45. 75 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 212 (1961).
46. 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(a) (1958). The ICC was originally given the power to regulate trackage agreements by § 1(18) of the

Transportation, Act of 1920. 41 Stat. 477 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C.

§ 1(18) (1958). See Fresno Passenger Terminal Case, 290 I.C.C. 753, 757
(1955).

47. Transportation Act of 1920 § 3(4), 41 Stat. 479, as amended, 49

(1958).
§ 3(5)
U.S.C.
53 (1953).
I.C.C.
48. 290
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58 cents per train-mile. Counting the revenue from bridge traffic
and ignoring deferred maintenance of 881,000 dollars, the line
abandoned was a profitable operation. Nonetheless, substitution
of the trackage route was approved since the bridge traffic could
move more economically over it. Under this condition, forced rehabilitation of the abandoned line would have been an undue
burden on petitioner and on interstate commerce.4
Where the carriers are not part of the same system, the problems
of one railroad abandoning a segment of line and negotiating an
agreement for trackage on a parallel line are numerous. The Illinois Terminal Ry. Abandonment" is a recent example. Petitioner
applied to abandon 42 miles of line and acquire trackage on the
Illinois Central, part of which paralleled petitioner's line. A rental
of one dollar and 48 cents per train-mile was agreed upon. While
petitioner was able to bargain to keep exclusive service to those
industries on the parallel portion of line served only by its spur
tracks, it had to agree not to serve industries on the portion of
trackage over the Illinois Central line that had not been parallel
to its own. Petitioner further agreed not to allow other railroads to
use any portion of its tracks or facilities on the line in question;
the Illinois Central's purpose in bargaining for this clause was to
prevent its rival, the Wabash Railway, from acquiring trackage over
petitioner's line in Decatur to a major industrial firm served only
by petitioner and the Illinois Central. In spite of the restrictive
character of this clause as a barrier to market entry by other carriers over Illinois Terminal's tracks, the Commission overruled
the protests of Wabash and other protestants. The restriction was
held consistent with the public interest.
Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Trackage Rights5 illustrates the magnitude of expenses saved by trackage rights over parallel main lines
and abandonments of excess capacity. In this case, which preceded the Erie-Lackawanna merger, the Lackawanna acquired trackage over 75.8 miles of the parallel Erie Railroad from Binghamton
to Gibson, New York, and the Erie acquired trackage over 20.2
miles of the Lackawanna. The Lackawanna was permitted to
49. 290 I.C.C. at 76. For a similar trackage case of a Western Pacific
subsidiary over its parent's line, see Sacramento No. Ry., 295 I.C.C. 73
(1955). In this case, the necessary rehabilitation that was avoided by abandonment and trackage over the parent's line was about $2,800,000 on a 50
mile line. On the issue of including bridge traffic in revenue calculations for
the profitability of lines, see Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 271 I.C.C. 261, 279
(1948), reversing in part 267 I.C.C. 38 (1946). The earlier decision included
a denial of trackage rights.

50. 312 I.C.C. 607 (1961).

51. 295 I.C.C. 743 (1958); see Central of Ga. Ry., 317 I.C.C. 184

(1961).
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abandon 54.2 miles of its main line. The Erie main line was
easily able to accommodate the 31 daily trains of the Erie and
the 24 daily trains of the Lackawanna. The installation of reversible signaling doubled the capacity of the Erie's Elmira yards and
made it more than able to handle the trains of both carriers. The
estimated annual reduction of expenses was 481,000 dollars for
the Erie and 625,000 dollars for the Lackawanna, or a total of
1,106,000 dollars for the two carriers.
Another method of increasing railroad capacity through trackage agreements is for parallel single-track lines of two railroads to
be operated jointly. In Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Operation,52 the
Santa Fe and the Rio Grande each owned single track lines between
Denver and Bragdon, Colorado, a distance of 105 miles. Each of
them granted trackage rights to the other, and they operated the
two lines jointly as a double-track operation. The Southern Pacific
and the Western Pacific have a similar joint double-track operation of their parallel lines in Nevada.
In situations where trackage agreements prove not to be the
most economic operation for parallel lines, a joint use agreement may be used. This is common in terminal areas. In Operation by Union Belt,53 the Pennsylvania, the Pere Marquette, and
the Wabash had formerly used trackage over each other's lines in
the Detroit terminal area. Finding this uneconomical, they organized the Union Belt as their agent to operate all Detroit tracks of
the owners. This enabled merger of the owning carriers' trains in
the terminal area, a significant cost reduction factor. In International-Great No. R.R. Trustee Trackage Rights,' a similar joint
use agreement, allowing combined trains, switching, and supervision, was substituted for a trackage agreement over an international
bridge at Laredo, Texas.
Where a trackage agreement is not over lines of a parallel carrier and, therefore, is not part of an abandonment proceeding, its
purpose is usually to give the railroad acquiring trackage an entry
into a territory it has not before served. Such a case is Operation
of Line by Gulf, M. & No. R.R.55 Petitioner's northern terminus
had been Jackson, Tennessee; in this proceeding, it acquired
trackage over the Louisville & Nashville from Jackson, 145 miles
north to Paducah, Kentucky. It was not claimed that this extended
52. 244 I.C.C. 32 (1940), supplementing 221 I.C.C. 145 (1937).

53. 131 I.C.C. 384 (1927). For a case involving terminal trackage rights
and joint use of a passenger station, see Erie R.R., 295 I.C.C. 303 (1956).
54. 282 I.C.C. 30 (1951), supplementing 275 I.C.C. 27 (1949).
55. ill I.C.C. 583 (1926), supplemented, 124 I.C.C. 641 (1927). See
discussion of economies in a similar case, Fort Worth & D.C. Ry., 99
I.C.C. 73, 75 (1925).
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operation would create new transport business. Nevertheless, the
application was granted. The carrier demonstrated that eliminating
the Jackson interchange and moving trains over a longer through
route was a more economical operation, and no other carriers protested the agreement. It is clear that the Louisville & Nashville
would not have entered the agreement if its rentals, which were set
at one-half the interest and operating cost of the line, were not
expected to exceed the previous revenues from interchange with
petitioner.
If a trackage agreement merely creates duplicate facilities without more economical routes, application for Commission approval
will be denied.5 6 But one leading case indicates that approval of a
trackage agreement that does create more economical routes will
also be denied where so much traffic is likely to be diverted to it
that it would endanger the solvency or impair the operation of
rival carriers. In Chicago, B. & Q.R.R.,5 7 the Burlington and the
Santa Fe jointly proposed to acquire the entire stock of the Kansas
City, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company, a 156 mile line
from Mexico, Missouri, to Kansas City. The Santa Fe also applied to acquire trackage over a 112 mile segment of the Burlington
from Mexico, Missouri, to St. Louis. The acquisition and trackage
together would have given the Santa Fe an entry into St. Louis.
The other railroads from the southwest intervened and protested
that a direct Santa Fe route into St. Louis would divert so much
traffic that they would have to curtail service and abandon some
lines. Accepting this argument, the Commission denied the acquisition and the trackage rights.5 8 As pointed out in Commissioner
Mahaffie's dissent, such a barrier to new, more efficient routes cannot be in the public interest. 9 Subsequently, the Burlington was
allowed to acquire trackage over the Kansas City, Chicago & St.
Louis Railroad from Mexico, Missouri, to Kansas City, thus confirming that the whole purpose of the earlier denial was to bar
Santa Fe entry into St. Louis.60
56. Lehigh Valley R.R., 312 I.C.C. 389 (1961); Northeast Okla. R.R.,
252 I.C.C. 273, 285 (1942). The former case involved 179 miles of trackage over the Erie to enable the applicant to become a rival to carriers offering second day service between the Midwest and New England.
57. 271 I.C.C. 63 (1948).
58. Id. at 162-63. Another trackage proposal in this case, which was
also denied, was to allow the Burlington trackage rights over a Missouri section of the Santa Fe line from Chicago to Kansas City. As a result of this denial, the Burlington built a new line from Brookfield, Missouri, to Kansas City, paralleling those of the Sante Fe and the Wabash.
This unneeded duplicate facility cost $16,000,000. See Railway Age, Feb.
12, 1951, p. 113.
59. Id. at 166.
60. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 271 I.C.C. 675 (1949).
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Petitions to the Commission to compel main-line trackage agreements have generally been denied. First, the Commission has not
been given any general power to compel trackage agreements other
than those incidental to required terminal use. 6 Second, the
Commission has refused to make the granting of trackage rights a
condition to its approval of unifications under section 5(2) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. 62 In Detroit, T. & I.R.R. Control,' for
example, the Baltimore & Ohio intervened in an action of the
Pennsylvania and the Wabash to control the Ironton. It asked that

the Commission condition its approval of control on the Ironton
granting the Baltimore & Ohio trackage over its line into Detroit.

Noting that its right to impose such a condition in a control case
was questionable, the Commission also found no public need for
additional service into Detroit.
B.

TRACKAGE

AGREEMENTS

INCIDENTAL

TO

TERMINAL

UNIFICATIONS

Section 3 (5) of the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Commission power to compel trackage agreements incidental to compulsory use of another's terminal facilities. It provides:
If the Commission finds it to be in the public interest and to be
practicable without substantially impairing the ability of a carrier owning or entitled to the enjoyment of terminal facilities to handle its own
business, it shall have power to require the use of any such terminal
facilities, including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance
outside of such terminal, of any carrier, by another carrier or other
carriers, on such terms and for such compensation as the carriers affected may agree upon, or, in the event of a failure to agree, as the
Commission may fix as just and reasonable for the use so required,
to be ascertained on the principle controlling compensation in condemnation proceedings. .

..

The scope of this section as a means to compel railroad trackage

agreements is determined by the meaning of "public interest" in
this context and the meaning of "reasonable distance outside of
61. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 267 I.C.C. 163, 187 (1946); Baltimore &
O.R.R., 261 I.C.C. 535, 544 (1945); Alabama Tenn. & N.R.R., 124 I.C.C.
114, 115 (1927) (dictum). See Thompson v. Texas M. Ry., 328 U.S. 134,
146-47 (1946), holding that trackage rights begun under a voluntary agreement must continue until the ICC approves abandonment even though the
agreement has expired or is terminated.
62. 24 Stat. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1958).
63. 275 I.C.C. 455, 484-85 (1950); see Toledo P. & W.R.R., 295 I.C.C.
523, 540-41 (1957).
64. 41 Stat. 479 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 3(5) (1958). (Emphasis added.) In
the Transportation Act of 1920, this was § 3(4). It was renunibered § 3
(5) in the Trhnportation Act of 1940. See 3A SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION 411-21 (1935).
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such terminal." In Chicago & A.R.R. v. Toledo, P. & W. Ry.,"5 the
latter phrase was construed; the Commission held that 12
miles was a reasonable distance in relation to the Peoria, Illinois, terminal. In this case, compulsory trackage was ordered even
though it was not into defendant's terminal, but to a connection
with the Peoria and Pekin Union, a union terminal railroad in Peoria. Since this compulsory agreement replaced a voluntary agreement that had been terminated by defendant, public interest was
found in the continuance of access to a major city by a large carrier. It is notable, however, that an action for compulsory trackage
cannot be used to reduce charges by reforming an existing voluntary trackage agreement. 6 Also, if the local terminal railway has
given adequate, proper, and equal service to the main-line carriers
and to shippers, the public interest will not require that the carriers be given trackage over the terminal facility.67
A recent decision holds that section 3(5), together with section
1(21),68 which gives the Commission power to require extensions of line, enables the Commission to order both the acquiring
road and the owning road to enter a trackage agreement in a terminal area. In City of Milwaukee v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 69 the
city asked that the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific be ordered to complete a cross-over track across the right-of-way of the
North Western to Milwaukee Harbor and that the North Western be
ordered to grant such use of its right-of-way. Finding direct service to the harbor by the Milwaukee Road to be reasonably required
by the public interest, the Commission issued the order. But it is
unlikely that the Commission would order reluctant railroads to
acquire terminal trackage over another line just to serve one
shipper.7"
The purpose of section 3(5) is to open terminals and terminal
tracks to all main-line carriers serving a city.71 If one or more
main-line carriers acquire a local terminal railroad, the Commission
65. 146 I.C.C. 171 (1928).
66. United States ex rel. Chicago Great W.R.R. v. ICC, 294 U.S. 50
(1935), affirming 71 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1934), affirming Missouri-Kan.Tex. R.R. v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 104 I.C.C. 203 (1925).
67. Stewart Inso Bd. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 188 I.C.C. 535
(1932).
68. 41 Stat. 478 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1(21) (1958).
69. 283 I.C.C. 311 (1951), modifying 279 I.C.C. 521 (1950).

70. Francis & Swaim v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 255 I.C.C. 633
(1943); see Jamestown, N.Y., Chamber of Commerce v. Jamestown, W.
& N.W.R.R., 195 I.C.C. 289 (1933).
71. Railroad Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U.S. 331, 343-44
(1924) (dictum); Hastings Commercial Club v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
69 I.C.C. 489, 493 (1922), rev'd on other grounds, 107 I.C.C. 208 (1926).
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will order that their terminal facilities and tracks be kept open to
the other main-line carrier serving the city.' Economic reasons
underlie the issuance of mandatory trackage orders as opposed to
service orders, which require the owning railroad to take over
the cars of the other carrier and deliver them to industrial sidings.
The carrier acquiring trackage is better able to co-ordinate terminal movements with arrivals and departures of its main-line
trains, thus giving faster service to industrial shippers on the trackage line.73 These shippers also favor such an arrangement because it gives them direct-line connections with all other businesses on the line of the carrier acquiring trackage, and it supplies
them with an additional source of empty cars.
Under the statute, the carriers are given time to negotiate a
compensation agreement when use of terminal tracks is ordered.
Only when they are unable to negotiate such an agreement will
the Commission undertake to set compensation. The statute states
that the compensation shall be ascertained on the principle controlling compensation in condemnation cases-the difference between the value of the property before and after the taking. Since
the trackage right is a license (a nonassignable personal privilege
to do acts of a temporary nature upon the lands of another) terminable by the Commission, compensation must be computed as an
annual rental. The calculation of total operating and maintenance
costs includes a return at market interest rates on the value, at the
date of filing of the action, of property used.
The Kansas City Terminal case74 is the leading decision on
the determination of compensation for compulsory use of terminals. After the Commission determined the annual cost of operation of the property used under trackage rights, the question was
how to divide this cost between the 12 carriers using the terminal
line. The smaller carriers argued that the division should be on a
user basis so that the larger carriers would pay a greater share of
the total costs; the larger carriers argued that the total costs should
be divided equally between the users. The Commission ruled in
favor of equal division of costs since most railroad line costs are
fixed rather than variable with use; it felt that this method was
supported by the procedure in condemnation cases.75 Since the
total line capacity was made available by the owner for the use of
all tenants no matter how much one's traffic might increase or de72. Erie R.R., 278 I.C.C. 425 (1950), supplementing 269 I.C.C. 493
(1947).
73. Erie R.R., 275 I.C.C. 679, 684-85 (1950).
74. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 198 I.C.C. 4

(1933).
75. 198 I.C.C. at 8-13.
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crease in any given year, the Commission determined that each
carrier was paying for an equal share of owner's line capacity.7"
CONCLUSION
Voluntary pooling-of-service and trackage agreements represent
efforts by railroads to reallocate the utilization of fixed plant for
more intensive use, thereby increasing operating efficiency. There
is no situation where such an agreement, by itself, can be injurious
to the public interest, for the interest of the general public is in
adequate and efficient railroad service along those routes and to
those towns where business is sufficient to pay for the carriers'
services. The fact that almost all pooling and trackage agreements proposed by the railroads have been supported by the local
shippers and approved by the ICC indicates the clear public benefit from such partial co-ordination. Unfortunately, the public interest standard has no quantitative measure. Objections to pooling and trackage agreements by private interests in towns that lose
some employment in railroad shops are clearly offset by gains to
shippers and to the public of better through service. Objections by
such towns based on arguments favoring the preservation of interrailroad competition are based on a delusion. Two or three carriers in an area with large excess capacity and government sponsored cartels in rate-making do not compete.7 7 Railroads are
regulated monopolies because there is no effective interrailroad
competition. For this reason, preservation of competition should
not be one of the criteria used in approving railroad co-ordination
proposals.
The decisions on the two major voluntary trackage proposals
to which the Commission denied approval seem wrong. In Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 8 the operation of the trackage agreement, by
giving the Santa Fe an entry into St. Louis, would have shifted
traffic from more circuitous routes and avoided interchange delays. Likewise, in Lehigh Valley R.R. Trackage Rights,7 9 operation over the Erie lines would have enabled the Lehigh Valley to
offer second-day service between the Midwest and New England,
but would have sharply curtailed the carload freight delivered by
applicant to smaller Eastern carriers. Neither case involved significant new investment in an industry burdened with substantial
76. Id. at 9-13.
77. For a more detailed economic analysis of the absence of effective interrailroad competition, see Conant, Railroad Consolidations and the Antitrust Laws, 14 STAN. L. REV. 489-95 (1962).
78. 271 I.C.C. 63 (1948); see text accompanying note 57 supra.
79. 312 I.C.C. 389 (1961); see note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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over-investment. Both applications were denied because of the
prospect that smaller rivals would suffer financially and have to
curtail services. But this is the usual result of industrial re-organization in the direction of more efficient operation. In an industry,
like railroads, with substantial over-investment in fixed plant,
failure of some firms is the likely result of changes directed toward more efficient operations. Those sections of such failing
carriers that can be rehabilitated and made viable operations will
be acquired at bankruptcy sale by more efficient connecting roads
and incorporated into them.
Pooling-of-service and trackage agreements, as a technique for
railroad co-ordination and cost reduction, can lead to lower rates
and thereby benefit all shippers. For this reason, such agreements
should be promoted by statute rather than hindered by bureaucratic review. Regulation of such agreements should be terminated by
the repeal of section 5 (1) and the trackage portions of section 5 (2)
of the Interstate Commerce Act. This would leave the railroads
free to enter such pooling-of-service and trackage agreements as
they find desirable. It would not, however, end the regulation of
abandonments of railroad lines or discontinuances of services even
though such withdrawal of investment in plant may be a logical
supplement to a pooling or trackage agreement. Arguments for relaxing the regulation of pooling and trackage agreements cannot
be applied to abandonments and discontinuances because of their
great long-run effect on the service that railroads are able to render.
Pooling and trackage agreements should be actively promoted
by the ICC. The Commission should call conferences of carrier
representatives in each metropolitan area to review the supply of
and demand for railroad services in the area. Railroads that have
neglected to review the efficiency of their fixed plant in any area
would then have an opportunity to make such a review in cooperation with the other carriers serving the same area. At such conferences, the relative efficiencies of pool, trackage, and joint-use agreements for any particular co-ordination project could be examined.
The result should be the planning of agreements for co-operative,
more efficient utilization of railroad lines and equipment.
The law relating to compulsory trackage agreements is also in
need of revision. The present power of the ICC under section 3 (5)
to order only those trackage agreements that are incidental to
required terminal unification should be expanded to cover all railroad lines."0 Only such a general power in the Commission can
80. See Note, State Power To Order Railroad Trackage Agreements,
12 STAN. L. REv. 674, 681 (1960).
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guarantee the most efficient trackage systems. When, for example,
the Baltimore & Ohio's trackage over the Pennsylvania Railroad
from Philadelphia to New York was terminated in 1926, it
had to lease rights over the less convenient routes and terminals of
the Reading and Central Railroad of New Jersey.8 1 In other
cases, refusals to negotiate voluntary trackage agreements have resulted in wasteful building of unneeded parallel lines."2 A voluntary trackage agreement of two parallel lines, although in the
public interest, may fail to realize all possible economies if it is
made to the exclusion of a third parallel line. Only a general power
in the Commission to order main-line trackage agreements by compulsion and to set reasonable compensation for the use of such
trackage will remedy this deficiency.
A strong argument can also be made in favor of giving a general power to the Commission to compel pooling-of-service agreements.8 3 Two carriers with parallel losing services may both apply
for a discontinuance when investigation might prove that one
pooled service could be profitable. Both Pennsylvania and the
Baltimore & Ohio, for example, offer passenger service from Chicago to Washington, D.C. Both carriers report large passenger deficits, and the Baltimore & Ohio has threatened to apply to the
Commission to discontinue all passenger service. 4 Since the Baltimore & Ohio segment of line from Pittsburgh to Washington,
D.C., is much shorter, a pooled service operating over the Pennsylvania from Chicago to Pittsburgh and over the Baltimore &
Ohio from Pittsburgh to Washington, D.C., may be a solution."s
If the carriers, through inertia or deadlock, could not negotiate a
pooling agreement, the Commission should have the power to
compel one. The presence of such statutory power in the Commission should itself result in a greater readiness by the carriers to
enter voluntarily into pooling-of-service agreements.

81. Baltimore & O.R.R., 138 I.C.C. 171 (1928); see Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and
Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242, 264-65 (1938).
82. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 261 I.C.C. 227, 233 (1945); Alabama, T.
& N.R.R., 124 I.C.C. 114, 115 (1927).
83. See Note, Regulation of Railroad Service Competition, 48 YALE
L.J. 143, 148 (1938).
84. Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1962, p. 22, col. 3.
85. Conant, The Railroad Passenger Deficit: A Comment, 33 LAND
ECON. 363, 365 (1957).

